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Hennis: Recovery of Exemplary Damages from the Estate of a Tortfeasor is

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-SURVIVAL STATUTE-Recovery
of Exemplary Damages From the Estate of a Tortfeasor
is Permitted Under the Texas Survival Statute
Hofer v. Lavender,
679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
June Hofer was driving a vehicle occupied by her parents, J.D. and Joan
Hofer, when it was struck by a vehicle driven by Robert W. Springate.' At
the time of the accident, tests indicated that Springate had a blood alcohol
content of .27%.2 June Hofer died a few hours after the accident, and Robert Springate died of unrelated causes after Hofer's parents had filed suit, but
before the case came to trial.3 This suit instituted by the Hofers, pursuant to
the Texas Survival Statute 4 and the Texas Wrongful Death Act,' sought,
among other things, exemplary damages for themselves and the estate of

their daughter. 6 Upon Springate's death, his personal representative, Sharon

1. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984).
2. See id. at 471. The jury verdict of the 117th District Court, Nueces County, found
Springate guilty of gross negligence and various acts of negligence, which were determined to
be the proximate cause of June Hofer's death. See Lavender v. Hofer, 658 S.W.2d 812, 813
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
3. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984).
4. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958). The Texas Survival Statute
provides in pertinent part:
All causes of action upon which suit has been or may hereafter be brought for personal
injuries, or for injuries resulting in death,. . . shall not abate by reason of the death of the
person against whom such cause of action shall have accrued, nor by reason of the death
of such injured person, but, in the case of the death of either or both, all such causes of
action shall survive to and in favor of the heirs and legal representatives and estate of such
injured party and against the person, or persons liable for such injuries and his or their
legal representatives, and may be instituted and prosecuted as if such person or persons
against whom same accrued were alive.
Id.
5. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1958). The pertinent part of the Texas
Wrongful Death Act provides that "[w]hen an injury causing the death of any person, occurring either within or without this state, is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, carelessness,
unskillfulness, or default of another person, ....

such persons.

. .

shall be liable in damages

for the injuries causing such death." Id.
6. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984). The majority states that
"[q]uite plainly, the Hofers have no cause of action for exemplary damages under the Wrongful Death Act because TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 cannot enlarge upon TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 26." See id. at 475. The majority's rationale for precluding the award of
exemplary damages under the Texas Wrongful Death Act is based on the interpretive commentary to TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26. See id. at 475. Article 16, section 26, of the Texas
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Lavender, was substituted as defendant. 7 The jury awarded J.D. and Joan
Hofer each $100,000 and the estate of their daughter $200,000 in exemplary
damages.' The Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that the Hofers could not recover exemplary damages for themselves
individually, nor as the representatives of the estate of their daughter against
Springate's estate. 9 The Texas Supreme Court granted the Hofer's writ of
error.'" Held-Reversed. Exemplary damages can be assessed against the
estate of a tortfeasor under the Texas Survival Statute."
Exemplary damages, synonymous with "punitive," "vindictive," "smart
money," and "presumptive damages,'12 are awarded to a plaintiff beyond
the amount necessary to compensate him for injury or loss sustained as a
Constitution provides that "[e]very person ... that may commit a homicide through willful
act, or omission, or gross neglect shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving
See TEX.
husband, widow, heirs of his or her body or such of them as there may be.
CONsT. art. XVI, § 26. The interpretive commentary states:
If the [1860] act created a new cause of action, distinct from any that the deceased might
have had, had he survived, then exemplary damages would die with the deceased. On the
other hand, if the cause of action was a mere continuation of the deceased's cause of
action, exemplary damages would still be the part of the judgment that the deceased's
family could collect.
See id. interp. commentary (Vernon 1955).
7. See Lavender v. Hofer, 658 S.W.2d 812, 812 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd,
679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
8. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984). The jury for the 117th District, Nueces County, assessed actual damages against Lavender in the amount of $109,837.25
and, in addition, awarded the Hofers $10,000 in actual damages for the loss of society and
companionship of their daughter. See Lavender v. Hofer, 658 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984). Exemplary damages are defined as
that award beyond the amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole. See Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 168 N.E. 798, 800 (N.Y. 1933). The trial court in Hofer defined exemplary damages for the jury as "an amount which you may award in your discretion and as an
example for the good of the public, in the interest of society at large in deterring the commission of similar wrongs." See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1984).
9. See Lavender v. Hofer, 658 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd,
679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984). The reversal of the award of exemplary damages was based solely
on the proposition that a decedent tortfeasor's estate could not be liable in an assessment of
punitive damages. See id.at 812, 817.
10. See Hofer v. Lavender, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 504 (July 11, 1984). The writ of error was
granted on February 8, 1984. See id. at 504.
11. See Lavender v. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984). The court in Hofer distinguished the effect of the Texas Wrongful Death Act because J.D. and Joan Hofer are not in
that class of persons who can recover exemplary damages in a wrongful death action. See id.
at 475.
12. See McAdams v. Blue, 164 S.E.2d 490, 494 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968) ("vindictive" damages proper); South Tex. Coaches v. Eastland, 101 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1937, writ dism'd) (exemplary damages not allowed as compensation, but as "smart money");
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.09, at 204 (1973) (indicating various
names and synonyms used in place of "punitive" damages).
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result of a tortfeasor's misconduct. 3 The origin of the doctrine of punitive
damages is firmly embedded in the English case law of the eighteenth century.14 In 1763, an English court fully articulated and applied the concept
of exemplary damages with approval in response to a brazen public attack
made upon the liberty of an English subject. 5 Although the majority of
American jurisdictions presently allow exemplary damages, 16 Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington are the sole members of a jurisdictional minority which continue to reject the award of punitive or exemplary damages. 17 Even though these states are in the minority, arguments
exist in support of such a view, based on the theory that the underlying

13. See Kirschbaum v..Lowrey, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (Minn. 1925) (punitive damages can
be awarded in addition to damages received as compensation to plaintiff); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 168 N.E. 798, 800 (N.Y. 1933) (juries allowed to award damages which
express indignation at defendant's malfeasance in addition to damages which set dollar amount
on plaintiff's loss); see also J. DUFFY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A DOCTRINE WHICH SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 6 (Defense Research Inst. Mono-

graph No. 15, 1969) (calling for reversal of judicial trend in extending award of punitive
damages).
14. See J. GHIARDI & J. KRICHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 101,

at 1-3 (1981) (historical perspectives which gave rise to concept of punitive damages in eighteenth century England); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2, at 26-28 (1980) (delineation

of English eighteenth century case law giving rise to idea of punitive damages).
15. See Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (1763). The plaintiff sought damages
against the secretary of state, who had issued a general warrant which led to plaintiff's arrest
and detainment for six hours. Lord Chief Justice Pratt found the detainment more odious
than the Spanish Inquisition. The court refused to find the 3001 damage award outrageous or
excessive and, instead, found that the jury had "done right in giving exemplary damages." See
id. at 769. Recently, commentators have postulated theories regarding the basis of the origin
of punitive damages. See, e.g., J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1.02, at 3-5 (1981) (explanations as to why punitive damages were first allowed
and purposes to be met by their award); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2, at 24-31

(1980) (theory that punitive damages may have arisen from the Code of Hammurabi, the Hittite Law, the Hindu Code of Manu, and other ancient law codes); Sales, The Emergence of
PunitiveDamages in ProductLiability Action: A FurtherAssault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 351, 353 (1983) (theories and postulates proposed to explain origin of exemplary
damages).
16. See, e.g., Alaska Polar Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing validity
of punitive damages but confining their award to narrow limits); Beebee v. Pierce, 521 P.2d
1263, 1264 (Colo. 1974) (recognizing purposes to be met by award of exemplary damages);
FBC Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d 595, 599 (Va. 1973) (validating punitive damages as
means to punish defendant and deter public from committing similar wrongs).
17. See McCoy v. Arkansas Nat'l Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 386 (La.) (rejecting in toto
awards of exemplary damages), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943) (only time exemplary damages
awardable is when statutory authorization exists); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474
(Neb. 1975) (rejecting idea of punitive damages in civil cases); Standard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94,
98 (Wash. 1977) (doctrine of award of punitive damages discussed).
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rationale of punitive damages is not met by their award.1 8
Traditionally, the purposes for exemplary damages have fallen into either
the deterrence or punishment category. 9 Recently, however, various purposes beyond the limited categories of deterrence and punishment of the
tortfeasor have been offered with increasing regularity.2 ° Preserving the
peace, inducing private law enforcement, compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable loss, revenge, paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees, and
deterring others from committing an offense have all been offered as additional purposes for the award of exemplary damages. 2 I Even so, some states
strictly adhere to the position that punitive damages are only intended to
punish the defendant and to prevent him from repeating actions which are
willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. 22 Other states view exemplary dam18. See J. DUFFY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A DOCTRINE WHICH SHOULD BE ABOLISHED,
THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4, 6 (Defense Research Inst. Monograph No. 15,
1969). The author sees punitive damages as serving no valid function in American jurisprudence and views their award as a "confiscation of private property in derogation of constitutional safeguards," when one considers compensation and restoring an individual to the status
quo as the primary goals of tort law. See id. at 6.
19. See, e.g., Trahan v. Cook, 265 So. 2d 125, 130 (Ala. 1972) (exemplary damages, under
appropriate circumstances, can be awarded to punish defendant and discourage others from
similar wrongful conduct); Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 527
(Fla. 1975) (predominate function of punitive damages is to deter and punish); Wedeman v.
City Chevrolet Co., 366 A.2d 7, 12 (Md. 1976) (punitive damages to punish wrongdoer and
deter from similar wrong in future); see also Comment, The Admonitory Function of Punitive
Damages and its Impact on the Law of Fraud and Deceit, 26 ALA. L. REV. 288, 291 (1962)
(well settled in most jurisdictions that punitive damages punish defendant and deter other
potential wrongdoers).
20. See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980)
(punitive damages awarded to compensate plaintiff for "humiliation, sense of outrage, and
indignity"); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (W. Va. 1982) (exemplary damages support
public policy interests beyond simple punishment and deterrence); Note, Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520-22 (1957) (compensation to plaintiff and
revenge considered to be purposes to be met by award of exemplary damages).
21. See Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 135 (3d Cir. 1981) (punitive damages discourage
private retribution on part of individual wronged), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
458 U.S. 1101, 1101 (1982); Heyes-Albion v. Kuberski, 311 N.W.2d 122, 129 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (purpose of punitive damages not to punish defendant but to make plaintiff whole);
Planet Plows, Inc. v. Evans, 600 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ)
(award of punitive damages fulfills purpose of reimbursing plaintiff for attorney's fees); Ellis,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1983)
(purposes gleaned from wide range of judicial opinions and writings of various scholars commenting and expanding on those opinions); see also Ellis, Punitive Damages in Iowa Law: A
CriticalAssessment,66 IOWA L. REV. 1005, 1006-13 (1981) (viewing purposes as type of criminal sanction). But see LOGAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A DOCTRINE WHICH SHOULD BE
ABOLISHED, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 23 (Defense Research Inst. Monograph No. 15, 1969) (asserting punitive damages serve no purpose but are, in essence, criminal
penalty without required constitutional protection).
22. See Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (when reason for punish-
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ages as exerting a deterrent effect on members of the public as well as on the
defendant.2 3 A third group of states perceive the award of punitive damages
as compensation to the victim for injuries or losses sustained.2 4
In Texas, the stated purpose for exemplary damages is most often found
within the rubric of deterrence and punishment of the tortfeasor.2 5 The
award of exemplary damages has also been cited in Texas judicial decisions
as a method by which to deter members of the public from committing
wrong similar to that of a defendant who has been held to an assessment of
punitive damages. 26 Additionally, compensation for inconvenience to the
plaintiff and awarding money damages for losses too remote to be within the
category of actual damages have both been found by Texas courts as sufficient reason for the award of exemplary damages. 27 The award of reasonable attorney's fees has also been cited as a valid purpose to be considered.2"

ment ceases to exist because of death of tortfeasor, need for punitive damages also ceases);
Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (when defendant can no
longer be punished or deterred, punitive damages cannot be awarded); cf Allen v. Anderson,
562 P.2d 487, 489-90 (Nev. 1977) (exemplary damages cannot punish tortfeasor who has died).
23. See, e.g., Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 479 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Ark. 1982) (exemplary
damages must be sufficient to deter others besides tortfeasor at bar); Pringle Tax Serv. v.
Knoblauch, 282 N.W. 2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1979) (exemplary damages awarded as punishment
and as deterrent to wrongdoer and others); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 247
(Miss. 1979) (punitive damages assessed as example and warning to others).
24. See, e.g., Dorosota v. Lovin, 150 A. 692, 693 (Conn. 1930) (punitive damages are to
compensate plaintiff for injuries, not to punish defendant); Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 745, 747
(Mich. 1922) (compensation of plaintiff, not punishment of tortfeasor, purpose of exemplary
damages); Faye v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (exemplary damages are subcategory of
compensatory damages).
25. See, e.g., Bernal v. Seitt, 158 Tex. 521, 527, 313 S.W.2d 520, 523-24 (1958) (when
defendant grossly negligent, award of exemplary damages serves to punish wrongdoer); Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 109, 170 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1943) (purpose of exemplary damages to punish, not compensate, plaintiff with excess award); Bank of N. Am. v. Bell, 493
S.W.2d 633, 636-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (punitive damages
serve to discourage defendant from future wrongdoing).
26. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 650 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. 1983) (one purpose of exemplary
damages is to deter members of public from committing wrongs similar to those of defendant);
Chandler State Bank v. Dorset, 618 S.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ)
(exemplary damages serve as example to public-at-large); Burlington-Rock Island R.R. v.
Newrone, 239 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951, no writ) (discouraging others
from undertaking wrong similar to that of tortfeasor is valid purpose for award of exemplary
damages).
27. See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (inconvenience to plaintiff one purpose to be met by award of
punitive damages); Allison v. Simmons, 306 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (losses beyond scope of actual damages and inconvenience to plaintiff valid
purposes to be met by award of punitive damages).
28. See Planet Plows, Inc. v. Evans, 600 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1980, no writ) (attorney's fees one element to be considered in award of exemplary damages);
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One possible reason for the award of exemplary damages, which all Texas
courts exclude, is that of compensating the plaintiff for losses and injuries
suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct.2 9 By judicial fiat, the purposes underlying the award of exemplary damages have provided a means of
analysis by which courts can determine if their award is authorized under a
survival statute when the tortfeasor is dead. 30
Jurisdictions in the United States adhere to one of three possible positions
when the award of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor pursuant
to a survival statute is at issue. 3 The first group of jurisdictions has statutory law which directly addresses, and usually proscribes, the award of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor.3 2 Some jurisdictions do not
address the effect that a survival statute has when the plaintiff or the plainAllison v. Simmons, 306 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attorney's fees within scope of consideration when awarding exemplary damages). Allison is
often cited by courts as evidence for the proposition that exemplary damages are not confined
to the rubric of a deterrence/punishment function. See id. at 211; see also McDonald v. Bennet, 674 F.2d 1080, 1093 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982) (indicative of requisite considerations in determining amount of exemplary damages to be awarded).
29. See, e.g., Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. 1964)
(exemplary damages cannot be awarded as additional compensatory damages); Perdernales
Elec. Co-op. v. Schultz, 583 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ reed n.r.e.)
(exemplary damages awarded as punishment of wrongdoer, not compensation to plaintiff);
Courtesy Pontiac, Inc. v. Ragsdale, 532 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ
refed n.r.e.) (award of exemplary damages punishes defendant, not meant to compensate plaintiff). This position directly contradicts those jurisdictions which view punitive damages as
compensation to the victim. See Johnson v. Morris, 123 S.E. 707, 708 (Ga. 1924) (award of
exemplary damages to compensate plaintiff for wounded feelings); Faye v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342, 382 (1872) (exemplary damages within scope of compensation to plaintiff).
30. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (purpose of
punitive damages determinative when deciding if award of exemplary damages against decedent's estate valid); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (W. Va. 1982) (in broad survey on
whether punitive damages are awardable when defendant is dead, court finds functions to be
met by such award determinative).
31. See Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 61-62 (Ariz. 1970) (actions pursuant to survival
statute involving death of tortfeasor distinct from other statutory actions when tortfeasor
dead); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.10, at 30-

32 (1981) (implicit categorization of survival statutes in author's rationale when determining
which jurisdictions allow award of exemplary damages under survival statute when tortfeasor
is dead).
32. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101 (1973) ("[P]unitive damages shall not be
awarded nor penalties adjudged after the death of the person against whom such punitive
damages or penalties are claimed.
...); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-505 (Supp. 1984) ("[I]n the
event of the death of the wrongdoer . . . there shall be no punitive damages against the personal representative."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.100 (1979) ("In an action against an executor
or an administrator, any damages may be awarded which would have been recovered against
the decedent if he had lived, except damages . . . for the sake of example or to punish the
defendant."). But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1052 (Supp. 1984-85) (survival statute provides
for nonabatement of action upon death of one or both parties).
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tiffs estate seeks the right to punitive damages against a tortfeasor who has
died before trial.33 The final category of states are those states which discuss
the effect a broadly worded survival statute has when an award of punitive
damages against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor is an issue before the
3 4

court.

Before July 11, 1984, Texas had considered the issue of awarding punitive
damages against the estate of a tortfeasor only twice. 35 The first decision,
Wright's Administratrix v. Donnel, 36 was rendered by the Texas Supreme
Court in 1870, before the Texas Survival Statute had been passed. 37 The
majority in Wright held that punitive damages were not assessable against
the estate of a decedent tortfeasor. 3 a The second decision, Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. Jones,39 was decided in 1957 by the Waco court of appeals.' 4
Although the Texas Survival Statute had been passed more than fifty years
before the Jones decision, the court failed to consider the possible effects of
the Texas Survival Statute on the award of punitive damages against a

33. See Meighan v. Birmingham Terminal Co., 51 So. 775, 777-78 (Ala. 1910) (in not
allowing award of exemplary damages against decedent tortfeasor, statutory considerations left
unmentioned); Holm Timber Indus. v. Plywood Corp., 51 Cal. Rptr. 597, 603-04 (Ct. App.
1966) (only case law utilized when issue of whether punitive damages may be awarded against
estate of tortfeasor determined).
34. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 407-08 (Minn. 1982) (survival
statute declared partially unconstitutional but still construed as prohibiting punitive damages);
Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 489 (Nev. 1977) (construing NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.100
(1977)). The Nevada statute was amended in 1979 to specifically exclude the assessment of
punitive damages against the estate of a tortfeasor. See Nv. REV. STAT. § 41.100 (1979). At
the time of the Allen decision, the survival statute was "broadly phrased." See Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 489 (Nev. 1977) (survival statute viewed by court as nonspecific); Atlas
Property v. Didich, 213 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (exemplary damages allowed under Florida survival statute), cert. dismissed, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969). The Second
District Court of Appeals of Florida explicitly adopted the third district's holding in Atlas one
year later. See Johnson v. Rhinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), cert.
denied, 241 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1970).
35. See Wright's Adm'x v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291, 298 (1870) (punitive damages against
decedent's estate strictly prohibited); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432, 437
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages
against estate of defendant).
36. 34 Tex. 291, 291 (1870).
37. See id. at 291. The Texas Survival Statute was subsequently passed in 1895. See Law
of May 4, 1895, ch. 89, § 1-2, 1895 Tex. Gen. Laws 143, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 873
(1898).
38. See Wright's Adm'x v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291, 298 (1870). The court was amazed that
anyone would propose recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a "dead man." See id.
at 298.
39. 303 S.W.2d 432, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. See id. at 437. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Wright, the Waco
court of appeals found punitive damages unavailable against the estate of the tortfeasor. See
id. at 437.
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wrongdoer who died before trial.4 1 The second decision, like the first, found

the assessment of punitive damages against a defendant's estate improper.42

While many states have addressed the issue of awarding punitive damages
under a wrongful death act when the defendant is dead,43 very few states
have focused specifically on the award of punitive damages under a nonspecific survival statute when the defendant has died before a civil suit could
be completed.'
Only three states have rendered decisions on this narrow

issue of awarding punitive damages pursuant to a broadly phrased survival

statute.4 5 Since Nevada has subsequently amended its survival statute to
specifically prohibit the award of punitive damages,46 Florida and Minnesota
are the only two jurisdictions with case law interpreting a broadly worded
survival statute when awarding punitive damages.4 7 The Florida court rea-

41. See id. at 436-37. The majority relied on case law and not their own construction of
the Texas Survival Statute in arriving at their holding. See id. at 437.
42. See id. at 437. In addition to the Wright decision, the court attempted to find controlling precedent in Wright v. E-Z Fin. Co., 267 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (right to punitive damages exists only where sufficient facts will support their
award).
43. See, e.g., Shirley v. Shirley, 73 So. 2d 77, 85 (Ala. 1954) (punitive damages awardable
against estate of decedent tortfeasor under wrongful death act); Thorpe v. Wilson, 293 S.E.2d
675, 677 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (recovery of punitive damages against estate of defendant prohibited under wrongful death act); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (W. Va. 1982) (wrongful death action to recover exemplary damages against tortfeasor who has died). The court in
Hofer did not extensively consider the effect of the Texas Wrongful Act because J.D. and Joan
Hofer are not in that class of persons who can recover exemplary damages in a wrongful death
action. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984).
44. See Reynolds, Punitive Damages After Death-Can Tort Law Create Heaven and
Hell, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 63, 71 (1973) (relatively small amount of authority on whether punitive damages can be awarded when wrongdoer dies before trial could be held). The author
addressed the issue of awarding punitive damages against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor in
any circumstance, not just under the auspices of a survival statute. See id. at 71.
45. See Atlas Properties v. Didich, 213 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(allowing exemplary damages under survival statute), cert. denied, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1964);
Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (although declaring part of
survival statute unconstitutional, court still found award of punitive damages invalid when
tortfeasor is dead); Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 488 (Nev. 1977) (construing broadly
worded survival statute as prohibiting exemplary damages sought under its auspices).
46. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.100 (1977) (no proscription of award of exemplary
damages against estate of tortfeasor) with NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.100 (1979) (award of exemplary damages against estate of tortfeasor specifically proscribed). The Nevada statute was
enacted after the Allen decision in 1977. See Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 489 (Nev. 1977)
(citing numerous cases to avoid existing possibility of awarding punitive damages pursuant to
the then broadly worded Nevada survival statute).
47. See Atlas Properties v. Didich, 213 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (punitive damages allowed under survival statute), cert. denied, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (survival statute does not allow
award of punitive damages against deceased defendant).
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soned, by judicial interpretation of its survival statute, that punitive damages
are recoverable under its survival statute.48 Minnesota, on the other hand,
held that punitive damages, as allowed by a broadly worded statute, are not
awardable when the tortfeasor has died before trial.4 9 Although there are a
plethora of decisions considering the award of punitive damages when the
tortfeasor has died before trial,5" these decisions are based on common law
causes of actions and do not address the effect of a survival statute which
neither prohibits nor allows punitive damages. 5
In Hofer v. Lavender,5 2 the Texas Supreme Court allowed recovery of exemplary damages from the estate of a tortfeasor pursuant to the Texas Survival Statute." This holding was based on the majority's determination that
exemplary damages had been awarded for a multiplicity of purposes in previous Texas judicial decisions.54 Since past Texas case law stated that the
award of exemplary damages was not limited to the deterrence and punishment of a particular tortfeasor, the majority reasoned that it would be logical

48. See Atlas Properties v. Didich, 213 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968),
cert. denied, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969). The court found that the legislative intent of its
survival statute allowed for the award of punitive damages after the death of the tortfeasor,
despite a possible contrary state common law view. See id. at 280.
49. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982). The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to allow the award of punitive damages against the estate of the
tortfeasor after the plaintiff had brought suit under the Minnesota survival statute, MINN.
STAT. § 573.01 (1980). See id. at 401, 408.
50. See, e.g., Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 231 (10th Cir. 1962) (punitive damages not
available from estate of wrongdoer); Johnson v. Levy, 47 So. 422, 424 (La. 1908) (exemplary
damages not allowed against defendant's heirs); McAdams v. Blue, 164 S.E.2d 490, 494 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1968) (however aggravated the circumstances, vindictive damages not recoverable
against decedent's estate).
51. See, e.g., Wolder v. Rahm, 249 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1977) (punitive damages do
not survive wrongdoer's death when plaintiff brings medical malpractice suit); Pearson v. Galvin, 454 P.2d 638, 642 (Or. 1969) (plaintiff's cause of action in tort, alleging false imprisonment, will not sustain award of punitive damages once tortfeasor is dead); Dalton v. Johnson,
129 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (Va. 1963) (personal injury action by plaintiff will not support award of
punitive damages when wrongdoer dies before trial).
52. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
53. See id, at 475. The holding of the majority is based on an analysis embedded in
discovering the purposes of exemplary damages. See id. at 474.
54. See id, at 474. The court relied heavily on the "purposes of exemplary damages"
rationale because other jurisdictions which addressed the exemplary damage/deceased
tortfeasor issue relied on a purpose analysis. See id. at 474-75; see Atlas Properties v. Didich
213 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (public policy purposes provide basis for
decision), cert. denied, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d
400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (purpose of punitive damages determinative in holding); Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 490 (Nev. 1977) (reasons for punitive damages control in decision);
Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 13 (W. Va. 1982) (interests served by award of punitive damages provide court with theory to decide issue of awarding punitive damages against estate of
tortfeasor).
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to award exemplary damages when the other purposes authorized by previous case law could be met." The court also found that public policy called
for equal consideration of all purposes met by the award of punitive damages.5 6 With equal weight given to all purposes, the majority found no reason to proscribe the award of exemplary
damages when the
57

deterrence/punishment purpose was not present.
Justice Spears, writing for the dissent, is in accord with the majority's
view that the Texas Survival Statute is not conclusive as to whether exemplary damages are awarded under the statute's auspices. 58 Contrary to the
majority, however, Justice Spears notes only two purposes to be met by the
award of exemplary damages in Texas: (1) punishment of the wrongdoer;
and (2) making an example of the wrongdoer. 59 The dissent also states that
no jurisdictions, including Texas, have addressed the issue of whether exemplary damages can be awarded under a broadly worded survival statute.60
Asserting that no case law is therefore available to guide the court in its

decision, Justice Spears relies on his own opinion that the dual aims of exemplary damages, deterrence and punishment, should not be separated. 61 According to the dissenting opinion, when both purposes in assessing
exemplary damages against the estate of a tortfeasor cannot be met, they

should not be awarded.6 2

55. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984). The court restated previous
Texas case law purposes met by the award of exemplary damages: (1) serves as example to
others; (2) reimbursement for losses too remote to be considered as elements of actual damages; (3) compensation for inconvenience; and (4) payment for plaintiff's attorney's fees. See
id. at 474.
56. See id. at 475. The majority found that all purposes to be met by the award of punitive damages must be given equal consideration. See id. at 475.
57. See id. at 475. With the majority's holding, the decision in Wright's Adm'x v. Donnell, that exemplary damages are not assessable against the estate of defendant, was effectively
overruled, and dictim in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, that exemplary damages are not recoverable against the estate of the tortfeasor, was disapproved. See id. at 475.
58. See id. at 477 (Spears, J., dissenting). Justice Spears found that the Texas Survival
Statute did not expressly allow or disallow for the award of punitive damages under its auspices. See id. at 477 (Spears, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 477 (Spears, J., dissenting). The dissent did not recognize the purposes of
paying for attorney's fees, awarding damages too remote for actual damage consideration, and
compensation for inconvenience, which were proferred by the majority. See id at 477 (Spears,
J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting). Justice Spears divided other jurisdictional case
law into two categories: (1) holdings which did not discuss the effect of a survival statute; and
(2) holdings where the survival statutes specifically excluded recovery of exemplary damages.
See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting). Justice Spears used the words "in my opinion"
to base his decision. See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the general deterrence
effect of exemplary damages was premised on the public being aware of the tortfeasor's punish-
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In Hofer, the supreme court quickly dispensed with the issue of awarding
punitive damages in a case where the plaintiff has died, but the defendant
remains alive.6 3 The more difficult question of first impression before the
supreme court was whether to award punitive damages against the estate of
a decedent tortfeasor pursuant to a survival statute.' Although the court's
decision goes against the majority of jurisdictions that do not allow punitive
damages to be recovered against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor, 65 it must
be remembered that these jurisdictions limited to two the purposes for which
exemplary damages can be awarded: deterrence and punishment.66 In view
of the fact that up to eight purposes are met by the award of punitive damages,67 the court in Hofer was following the more modem view as to how
tort law and its damage awards should serve the public.6 8 By not focusing

ment. See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting). Since a deceased tortfeasor cannot be punished in
public view, the dissent found the deterrence function to be nonsupportable. See id. at 478
(Spears, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 472 (citing Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Co., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.
1981) and Houston Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962,
no writ)) (accepted judicial precedent that estate of deceased plaintiff can recover punitive
damages against living tortfeasor).
64. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 472-73 (Tex. 1984). The court seems intrigued by this issue of first impression evidenced by a rhetorical question at the outset of the
opinion, "[t]he argument advanced by the Hofers is that as the survival statute has been interpreted to allow the recovery of exemplary damages to survive the death of one injured, why
would not the same survival statute permit the recovery of exemplary damages against a deceased tortfeasor?" See id. at 472.
65. See Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 489 (Nev. 1977) (by great weight of authority,
punitive damages do not survive death of tortfeasor); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.10, at 30-32 (1981) (general rule appears to be punitive
damages are not recoverable against estate of deceased wrongdoer); see also M. MINZER, J.
NATEs, C. KIMBLE & D. AXLEROD, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.52, at 136, 137 (1984)
(majority of jurisdictions do not allow recovery from estate or personal representative of
tortfeasor who dies before judgment entered).
66. See, e.g., Campbell v. Government Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 1975) (function
of punitive damages to deter and punish); Motor Equip. Co. v. McLaughlin, 133 P.2d 149, 159
(Kan. 1943) (exemplary damages are to deter others and punish tortfeasor for his wrong);
Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (purpose of punitive damages to punish tortfeasor and deter him from repeating wrongful act).
67. See Ellis, Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 3 (1982-83). The author lists the following purposes gleaned from judicial opinions and
commentators: (1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from committing a
like offense; (3) preserving peace; (4) inducing private law enforcement; (5) compensating victims for losses otherwise uncompensable; (6) deterring others from committing an offense; (7)
paying attorney's fees. See id. at 3. Revenge has been cited as an eighth purpose. See Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521-22 (1957).
68. See Atlas Properties v. Didich, 213 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (public
policy dictates that where tortfeasor's wrongful act causes death, there should not be escape
from retribution), cert. denied, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12
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on only two purposes when determining if an award of exemplary damages
is to be made, 69 the court followed previous Texas law 70 and other jurisdictions which expand the purposes for awarding exemplary damages. 7 1 The
court reasoned that the death of a defendant should not prevent a plaintiff
from recovering punitive damages where the public deterrence purpose, as
well as other purposes, could still be served by their award. 72
Despite the dissent's posture, 73 previous Texas case law has found the purpose of exemplary damages to be beyond the restrictive deterrence/punishment function. 74 By stipulating that both purposes, deterrence
and punishment, must be present in order to permit exemplary damages
under a survival statute,7 5 the dissent has limited the award of exemplary

(W. Va. 1982) (public policy interests go beyond mere punishment of wrongdoer in award of
exemplary damages; therefore, purposes for their award do not cease with death of tortfeasor).
69. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Tex. 1984) (attorney's fees, reimbursement for losses too remote under compensation damages, and recovery as an example to
public were other purposes mentioned by court). The majority stated that all reasons for the
existence of exemplary damages should be given equal weight and consideration. See id. at
508.
70. See, e.g., Planet Plows, Inc. v. Evans, 600 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1980, no writ) (attorney's fees for plaintiff can be considered when awarding punitive
damages); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (inconvenience to plaintiff element for jury to consider in award of
punitive damages); Allison v. Simmons, 306 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (losses beyond scope of actual or compensatory damages valid reason to
award punitive damages).
71. See, e.g., Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 479 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Ark. 1972) (punitive damages serve to deter others); Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 693 (Conn. 1930) (punitive damages for compensation of plaintiff); Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922)
(exemplary damages viewed as further compensation to plaintiff for injuries suffered); see also
Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984) (following jurisdictions advocating expansion of purposes for award of exemplary damages).
72. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Tex. 1984). The majority found
other equally important policy considerations to be fulfilled by the award of exemplary damages besides the punishment of a tortfeasor, including compensating the injured plaintiff for
losses too remote to be considered under actual damages, providing an example to the public,
deterring future wrong similar to that of the defendant, and furnishing remuneration to plaintiff for inconvenience. See id. at 474.
73. See id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting) (recognizing only deterrence and punishment as
purposes to be served by award of punitive damages).
74. See McDonald v. Benett, 674 F.2d 1080, 1093 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Texas law,
court found exemplary damages not restricted to punishment and deterrence function); Pan
Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (plaintiff's inconvenience as result of tortfeasor's wrong aspect to be considered 'hen
awarding punitive damages).
75. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 478-79 (Tex. 1984) (Spears, J., dissenting).
Justice Spears advances the proposition that exemplary damages will deter the public-at-large
from future wrong similar to that of defendant only if the public can observe the tortfeasor's
punishment. Thus, with the deterrence function dependent on the punishment being observa-
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damages to a narrow range of situations.76 The only time punitive damages
would be permissible, according to Justice Spears' dissent, would be when
two specific purposes, to the exclusion of other purposes, were before the
court." This would leave unrecognized other possible reasons for the
awarding of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor.7 s The dissent's
position is in conflict with the rationale of modem judicial theorists who
decline to follow the logic that a fortuitious event, such as death of a
tortfeasor, should prevent an award of exemplary damages, stemming from a
cause of action in tort, where such damages would otherwise be permissible. 79 Although the majority's opinion is the current minority view,8 ° it
would seem to be that the rationale behind allowing a plaintiff to recover
damages against the estate of a decedent tortfeasor follows public policy interests which go beyond simple punishment of the wrongdoer.8,
The majority in Hofer views the function of punitive damages as extending
beyond a simplistic punishment/deterrence rationale.8 2 This approach provides for judicial flexibility and does not artificially limit the many purposes
ble, Justice Spears asserts that the death of the tortfeasor, preventing any possibility of
tortfeasor punishment, ipso facto destroys the deterrent affect of punitive damages. See id. at
478.
76. Cf id. at 478 (Spears, J., dissenting) (separation of dual aims of exemplary damages
will lead to flood of litigation). But see Bank of N. Am. v. Bell, 493 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (no mention of possibility of multiplicity of suit,
despite inclusion of mental anguish and inconvenience as elements to be considered in awarding punitive damages).
77. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. 1984) (Spears, J., dissenting)
(award of exemplary damages only valid when dual purposes of exemplary damages can be
met); see also Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982) (finding
purpose of punitive damages limited to punishment and deterrence in relation to defendant's
future conduct).
78. See, e.g., Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922) (exemplary damages can be
considered as possible compensation to injured plaintiff); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382
(1872) (punitive damages compensation for plaintiff, not punishment of defendant); Allison v.
Simmons, 306 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punishment of
defendant can serve as example for good of public).
79. See Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (W. Va. 1982) (in view of public policy,
exemplary damages should not be relegated to two categories); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE

TORTS § 126, at 901 (West 1971) (ultimately all actions in tort will survive death of
either plaintiff or defendant when cause of action is pursuant to survival statute).
80. See Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (citing numerous instances where decedent tortfeasor's estate cannot be liable for punitive damages); Allen v.
Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 488-89 (Nev. 1977) (majority of jurisdictions hold death of defendant
will cut off damage claims against estate of tortfeasor).
81. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 532-33
(1957) (considerations to be served by exemplary damages go beyond mere deterrence and
punishment).
82. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984). The majority's refusal to
limit the purposes of punitive damages to punishment and deterrence of the tortfeasor stems
LAW OF
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of punitive damages. By recognizing all of the purposes to be met by the
award of punitive damages, as delineated in prior Texas case law, a3 the
court's holding prevents a mere adventitious event, the death of the
tortfeasor, from cutting off the plaintiff's right to relief.8 4 A more constricted approach would lock nineteenth century jurisprudential technicalities into a twentieth century society.
Scott A. Hennis

from public policy considerations giving equal consideration to other purposes met by the
award of punitive damages. See id. at 475.
83. See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punitive damages may be awarded to compensate for inconvenience, reasonable attorney's fees, and "other losses too remote to be considered" under rubric
of actual damages).
84. See Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Tex. 1984).
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